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sufficient reason for the case to be tried at court, proceedings would be discontinued and the deposit forfeited. The
citizen making a request would have a right to appeal the
decision to discontinue the proceedings.
Once the charges are brought to a court, the proceedings would take place behind closed doors, in the presence of a legal representative of the accused. Court procedures should be based on a free evaluation of evidence. In
order to establish the existence of collaboration as a rule
the following evidence must be presented: (1)a card with
a file number, (2) a signed declaration of collaboration,
and (3)reports. Even if such documents can be produced,
in themselves they do not constitute proof of collaboration. If perjury is proven, sentencing and revocation of
the official mandate would follow. If, however, the accused is acquitted (the same concerns acquitted judges
and high-ranking state officials), he may request appropriate compensation from the state treasury and/or the
citizen who requested the inquiry.

Apart from the procedure described here, each citizen would have a right to turn to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and inquire whether, and in what capacity, his or
her own name is listed in their files. If that individual's
name is indeed listed in the files as an SB informer, the
person involved should be informed about the procedure
for challenging the record in court. The person involved
would act through his representative, an attorney sworn
to confidentiality and with access to the files. Limited
access to files is necessary to protect the rights of third
parties whose names might be mentioned in the files, as
well as to protect state secrets.
This article is based on a report by expertsfrom the Helsinki
Committee in Poland and the Helsinki Foundationfor Human
Rights: HalinaBortnowska, ProfJerzyCiemniewski MP,Prof
Janusz Grzelak, Prof Ewa Letowska, Marek A. Nowicki,
Marek Nowicki Prof Wiktor Osiatynski, Prof Andrzej
Paczkowski, DanutaPrzywara,and Prof Andrzej Rzeplinski.

The New World gallops to the rescue of the Old; a conversation among students of revolution, East and West.

Constitutional Reviews
The Future of Liberal Revolution
By Bruce Ackerman
(Yale University Press, 1992)

Reviewed by RichardA. Posner
This short book-really an essay-is a menu of political-legal
advice for Europe, both Western and Eastern, prepared by an
American constitutional theorist not heretofore known as a
deep student of continental institutions. The book was written
in haste and is marred by cliches, such as "hearts and minds,"
"clear a conceptual space," "our ongoing life together," and
"window of opportunity." An uncertain rhetorical note is
sounded in the first sentence: "From Warsaw to Moscow, Havana to Beijing, a specter haunts the world as if risen from the
grave: the return of revolutionary democratic liberalism." This
echo of the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto
doesn't work. Whatever we should call the vanquisher of
Communism, it is not some cemetery spook.
The argument of the book is easily summarized. The
collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union between 1989 and 1991 has created both dangers and

opportunities. The principal dangers are that Eastern Europe
will collapse back into autocracy, and that, freed from American "hegemony," Western Europe will resume its nasty nationalistic ways and the stage will be set for another world war.
The principal opportunity is for a "liberal revolution" that will
create a federated Europe dedicated to the principle of
"undominated equality" urged in previous books by Professor
Ackerman. Undominated equality is the real liberalism and is
to be distinguished from laissez-faire capitalism which some
Eastern Europeans, unduly influenced by Friedrich Hayek and
Milton Friedman, misunderstand to be the true liberalism. Liberal revolution is real revolution though it involves no shedding of blood. Essential to the liberal revolution will be the
adoption in each European state or, preferably, in a federated
Europe of a written constitution on the U.S. model and with
many though not all the provisions of our Constitution. The
new constitutions or constitution should be judicially enforceable but by a German-style constitutional court whose judges
have fixed terms of office rather than lifetime tenure as in our
federal judiciary. Liberal revolution thus fits hand in glove
with a written constitution. But it is antithetical to settling

scores by punishing officials of the prior, that is, Communist,
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regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, so the
desire for retribution should be resisted.
In part the book is a modest extension of themes that
Ackerman has expounded at greater length elsewhere. One is
the belief (which he shares with many other liberal theorists,
such as Ronald Dworkin) that the true liberalism is radically
egalitarian and therefore radically redistributive, so that the
Eastern Europeans who associate liberalism with Hayek and
Friedman are embracing false prophets. Another is the belief
elaborated upon elsewhere by Ackerman that post-revolutionary American constitutional history is in fact punctuated with
liberal-revolutionary moments, including the adoption of the
post-Civil War amendments that enlarged the power of the
federal government vis-i-vis the states and the eventual ratification by the Supreme Court of the New Deal's vision of federal
power. This proves, to Ackerman's satisfaction anyway, that a
written constitution can provide the framework for continual,
though not continuous, liberal revolution.
In part, therefore, the book is an exercise in persuasive
definition: Ackerman wishes to appropriate the words "liberal"
and "revolutionary," which carry for him highly positive connotations, and make them the names of his personal political
beliefs.
In part the book is good-natured, if faintly patronizing,
American universalism-the New World galloping to the rescue of the Old. Ackerman believes us Americans to be, despite
all our lapses, the exemplars of the good things in the Western
political tradition. Foreigners would therefore be wise to copy
our institutions. They're apt, it is true, to listen to us only in
times of crisis-it is in fact striking how little the Europeans
have imitated our legal and political institutions. But fortunately
(from this perspective) the present is a time of crisis for both
Eastern and Western Europe-the former in transition from
Soviet hegemony, the latter in transition from American hegemony.
In part the book is a voyage of discovery. Ackerman has
discovered features of the German legal system that he likes.
And in part it is a now-conventional warning against scoresettling in the former Communist bloc. This last part may
seem disconnected from the rest-the only connection that
Ackerman himself points to is that score-settling will distract
the Eastern Europeans from the important thing, which is drafting constitutions. (The historical parallel is the argument after
World War II that overly vigorous denazification would undermine West Germany's potential as a bulwark against Communism.) The deeper connection lies in the fact that punishment for newly declared crimes is discordant with American
constitutional traditions-which is why the Nuremberg trials
were controversial among American academic lawyers. The
ex postfato clause appears in the original Constitution; it thus
preceded the Bill of Rights. I must say that I think it presumptuous for coddled Americans to tell the victims of Com-

munism to let bygones be bygones.
I like short books; but a short book, to be persuasive, ordinarily must confine itself to a narrow subject. Ackerman's little
book covers too much ground. His preference for welfarism
over capitalism is not argued; it is asserted. He is correct that
pure laissez-faire, what today is sometimes called "anarchocapitalism," is unsound; it ignores monopoly and externalities,
and hence cannot be assumed to be efficient even in the narrowest economic terms. But redistributive liberalism, with its progressive taxation, heavy inheritance taxes, pervasive interventions in labor markets, and cradle-to-grave social insurance, is
not, as Ackerman implies it is, the only alternative to laissezfaire. A middle ground that he ignores is the pragmatic libertarian state, which intervenes in free markets just so far as is
necessary to achieve an efficient allocation of resources and
maintain peace and order. The United States today is intermediate between the redistributive liberal state and the pragmatic
libertarian state, though leaning toward the former.
Ackerman's preference for written constitutions is argued
more fully, but not adequately. The issue is an empirical one.
One observes that some nations, such as England, have gotten
on well without a written constitution, while others, such as
France and the nations of South America, have had a succession of written constitutions none of which seems to have been
productive of much good. Even that triumph of constitutionwriting, the U.S. Constitution, is an ambiguous example because it has been so bent and twisted by judicial interpretation-to which I have no objection, but it does illustrate the
limitations of trying to shape the future by paper. Ackerman
argues that if Israel had a written constitution with freedom-ofreligion clauses similar to those in our own First Amendment,
that country would have been spared its distracting religious
strife. But this argument ignores the endogeneity of constitution-writing. If religion were not such a divisive force in Israel,
the country might long since have had a written constitutionto which the religious controversies have in fact been the principal stumbling block. I am told that Hungary has the most
progressive laws dealing with the rights of minorities of any of
the Eastern European states. Of course. It has no significant
minorities.
Some of the ex-Communist nations appear to be in a state
of too great ferment to allow for effective constitution-making.
The U.S. Constitution was not drafted until six years after the
fighting ended with the defeat of the British at Yorktown.
Perhaps the Eastern European countries should be allowed a
similar breathing space..
I know even less about European law and politics than
Ackerman does, so I advance my own suggestions with even
greater diffidence. I needn't have used the comparative form:
there is no diffidence in Ackerman's book, even when he is at
his most operational, as when telling the Poles to convene a
special constitutional convention-pronto. For what little it

FALL 1992

may be worth I think that the priority for Eastern Europe and
the successor nations to the Soviet Union should be economic
rather than political: to create a functioning free-market system, a process furthest advanced, among those nations, in Poland. I thus would not, as Ackerman does, decry as "infatuation" the attraction of many of the leaders of the formerly
Communist nations to the "free market" model. It is true that
the economic and the political cannot be neatly separated, because political institutions undergird the economy. But the
political institutions necessary for prosperity are fairly elementary: an independent central bank, membership in the International Monetary Fund, legally enforceable property and
contract rights, a professional judiciary, a police force, a few
honest civil servants, and an otherwise noninterventionist state.
The rest is icing on the economic cake. This implies, by the
way, that Ackerman is probably correct that it would be a
mistake to allow people whose property was confiscated by the
Communists to get their property back. The effect of such an
entitlement is to unsettle property rights by creating a cloud on
title. The obvious alternative would be to give these peoplejust
compensation for the loss of their property-the fair market
value of the property when it was taken, plus interest to the
present-or at least as close to this amount as the nation can
afford. This would be better than giving the victims of confiscation nothing, because by recognizing the importance of property rights compensation encourages new investment.
As it happens, none of the elementary institutions of effective capitalism that I have listed above is actually guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution, a document that in its original form
(together with the first ten amendments, i.e., the Bill of Rights)
is preoccupied with issues of federalism, political structure, and
criminals' rights. The recent experience of several Asian nations (possibly including China) suggests that these issues are

secondary to the achievement of that modicum of prosperity
without which political stability in the modern world is unlikely. The main problem that led to our Constitution was that
the national government was too weak; that was also the problem behind the Fourteenth Amendment, the most important
of the post-Civil War amendments. A nation that does not
have the sorts of political problems for which American-style
federalism is a solution are unlikely to profit from imitating our
constitutional tradition. In any event the priority for poor
countries should be, I suggest, wealth rather than political liberty. Wealthy people don't like to fight-which is why I find it
hard to imagine the nations of Western Europe going to war
with each other once our guiding hand is withdrawn. They
also don't like to take orders. We should encourage nations to
become wealthy, confident that when they do, liberty is around
the comer. Once the formerly Communist nations achieve economic stability, they can train their sights on the constitutionally
ordained redistributive Utopia limned by Professor Ackerman.
I acknowledge the existence of difficult problems of transition. Some are technical, like the modalities of privatization.
Others are political. In the changeover from a Communist to a
free-market economy many people are hurt-people whose support may be essential for continuing the transition. The mollification of those people is a formidable challenge for statecraft,
but not one that Ackerman's book will help the countries of
Eastern Europe to meet. They cannot afford generous welfare
systems. Maybe they cannot afford to do without a certain
amount of score-settling which, by uniting the people in execration of a common enemy, will help them overlook the
economic issues that divide them.

La Democrazia in Europa
By Railf Dahrendorf, Francois Furet, and Bronislaw
Geremek, edited by Lucio Caracciolo
(Bari: Laterza, 1992)

the surprising difficulty of arranging the political spectrum
according to the traditional left-right scheme, which now seems
either outmoded or irrelevant. In the same spirit, they worry
about proportional representation exacerbating the tendency
toward ungovernability caused by political fragmentation.
Without a large middle class, Geremek notes, it is very difficult
to build a stable constitutional republic. (A centrist liberal
party such as his own Democratic Union, he adds, appeals to
only 4-6% of the population). They also discuss the chances
that fascist parties will emerge as strong actors, in light of the
legitimacy vacuum characterizing most of the new democracies.
Geremek's arguments are consistently pointed and interesting. He claims, for example, that lustration can never be
madejust or reasonable, given the tainted evidence being used
to incriminate collaborators. One of the most destructive legacies of Leninism, he also argues, is the lack of civic spirit, the

Reviewed by Stephen Holmes
This unusual book contains the transcript of impromptu conversations among three acute political observers concerning
the prospects for democracy in post-Communist Europe. The
conversations were taped during the winter of 1991-1992.
Without any trace of sympathy for the now vanished regime,
all three assume that the fall of Communism represents a great
crisis for our civilization, the dimensions and implications of
which we have not yet fully grasped. The range of issues they
touch upon is remarkable. For instance, they discuss the fragile
legitimacy of political parties in all post-Communist states and
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